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TALIENTO v. PORTLAND WESTNEIGHBORHOOD
COUNCIL: THE AT WILL DOCTRINE CONTINUJES
TO THRIVE IN MAINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Taliento v. Portland West Neighborhood Planning Council,1 Neil Taliento,
a program director at Portland West,2 brought suit against his former employer
claiming breach of contract for improper discharge,3 and alleging that Portland
West failed to follow the procedure for termination set forth in its personnel policy.
4
The trial court granted Portland West's motion for summary judgment, concluding
that Taliento had failed to establish that he was anything other than an employee-
at-will, 5 irrespective of the plain language of Portland West's Personnel Policy
1. 1997 ME 194,705 A.2d 696.
2. Portland West is a not-for-profit organization that acts as an umbrella for a number of
community programs funded primarily by state, federal, and local grants. See Brief for Appel-
lant at 2, Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 1997 ME 194, 705 A.2d 696
(No. CUM-96-812). Taliento was hired to be the program director of Portland West's Commu-
nity Employment Project (CEP), which provides job training to troubled youths. See id. In
1994, Taliento became the program director of a new program, YouthBuild Portland. See id.
This program, funded by a HUD grant, is designed to teach troubled youths construction skills.
See id.
3. There were four issues on appeal. The first issue, with which this Note is primarily con-
cerned, stated that "the [lower] court erred by finding there is no issue of material fact whether
Portland West's Personnel Policies altered his status as an employee who could be terminated at
will." Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 1997 ME 194,11, 705 A.2d at
697. The second issue was that the court erred "by finding [that] he had no contractual right to
an appeal process in which the president of the Board of Directors may cast a vote only to break
a tie." Id. The third issue was that the court erred "by finding that oral promises by Portland
West's Executive Director Peter O'Donnell did not create an employment contract for a definite
period of time and thereby limit O'Donnell's ability to recommend his termination" Id. The last
issue was that the court erred "by finding no issue of material fact whether he was an intended
third-party beneficiary of the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grants that fund
Portland West's YouthBuild Portland program (YouthBuild) and that he therefore did not have
an employment contract for the grant's two-year duration" Id.
4. See idL The pertinent section of Portland West's Personnel Policy, Paragraph 11, states:
Termination: The Executive Director and the Program Director have the authority to
recommend termination of an employee to the Personnel Committee only after docu-
menting the problem; informing the employee[;] and giving the employee a stated
period to correct the situation. The employee may appeal any decision of the Person-
nel Committee to the full Board of Directors.
Id. at 3, 705 A.2d at 698. Since the policy sets forth a specific three-step procedure for termi-
nation, discharge may be inferred to be for cause rather than at the will of the employer. See
infra Part IV.A (discussing this issue further).
5. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 1997 ME 194, 1 6, 8, 705
A.2d at 699. The employee-at-will doctrine, or terminable-at-will doctrine, allows an employer
the absolute power to terminate its employees, hired for an indefinite term, for any reason, even
if arbitrary and capricious. See Note, Protecting Employees At WillAgainst Wrongful Discharge:
The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. Ray. 1931, 1931 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Protecting
Employees At Will]. The theory behind the rule is that the employee, too, is free to leave her job
at will. Some commentators maintain that the doctrine is premised on the concept of freedom of
contract. See id. at 1933. It was created at a time when this country was beginning to industri-
alize and contractual freedom was, therefore, a valuable commodity. Cf. id. at 1933-34. Other
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and its seemingly binding nature. 6 Subsequently, Taliento appealed to the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine.7
Taliento provided the Law Court with an opportunity to consider whether per-
sonnel policies should be interpreted as binding, implied contracts 8 between em-
ployer and employee. The Law Court found that Taliento was an employee for an
indefinite term and, therefore, was terminable at the will of Portland West. This
Author contends that there was, however, an implied contract between Taliento
and Portland West.9 At the very least, an issue of material fact existed that should
commentators believe that the employment-at-will doctrine represents an economic or even a
social response to the developing modem capitalist economy. See Jay M. Feinman. The Devel-
opment ofthe Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976) (explaining the origins
and history of the at will doctrine). See also infra notes 12. 18 (citing additional authority
discussing the origins of the at-will doctrine). It is commonly thought that the at-will doctrine
originated in 1877 with a treatise by Horace Wood. See iU. at 125-26. See also H.G. WooD. A
TREATsE oN Tm LAw oF MAs'mr AND SER Anr § 134 (1877). Blaisdell v. Lewis, 32 Me. 515
(1851), however, is considered this state's first recognition of the doctrine.
6. There is evidence to suggest that O'Donnell and at least two board members thought that
the policy was binding. See Brief for Appellant at 12, Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood
Planning Council, 1997 ME 194, 705 A.2d 696 (No. CUM-96-812) (stating: The Superior
Court also received evidence that Members of Portland Vest's Board of Directors understood
the plain meaning of this language."). Furthermore, the Law Court found that:
Taliento testified to his familiarity with the Personnel Policies as a program director
who was regularly involved in the hiring and firing of staff; in June 1995, whenTaliento
told O'Donnell that he wanted to terminate a staff member, O'Donnell reminded him
(in a conversation documented by O'Donnell's handwritten notes) that he could not
do so without following the paragraph l I procedures; and O'Donnell admitted that he
followed the requirements when recommending the termination of another employee
to the Board's Personnel Committee later that year.
Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, J 25, 705 A.2d at 705-06.
7. See Taliento v. Portland V. Neighborhood Planning Council, 1 6,705 A.2d at 699.
8. There is a distinction between contracts "implied in fact" and contracts "implied in law."
Contracts implied in fact are one type of express contract. See 1 AnRM L ConN, Conain oN
Com'Acrs § 1.19 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (stating: "IThere is no difference be-
tween an express contract and an implied contract."). Contracts implied in law, sometimes
known as quasi-contracts, are quite different. It has been suggested that contracts implied in law
should not be called contracts at all because they are "created by the law for reasons of justice,
without any expression of assent and sometimes even against a clear expression of dissent...
Contracts are formed by expressions of assent." Id. § 1.20. This Note deals primarily with
implied in fact contracts.
9. An implied in fact contract is simply an offer and acceptance that is not in writing but can
instead be implied from the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the situation. See RE-
sT BTmE r(SEcoND) oF Com'xAcrs § 4 cmt. a (1981) [hereinafter Rsmmmr] ("Just as assent
may be manifested by words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to
make a promise may be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances,
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance."). One Minnesota court
explained that:
If the handbook language constitutes an offer, and the offer has been communicated
by dissemination of the handbook to the employee, the next question is whether there
has been an acceptance of the offer and consideration furnished for its enforceabil-
ity.... The employee's retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of
a unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave, the
employee supplies the necessary consideration for the offer.
Pine River State Bank v. Mettilie, 333 N.V.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983).
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have been submitted to a jury. The trend in a majority of jurisdictions has been
toward limiting the traditional employee-at-will doctrine. 10 There are legitimate
reasons why Maine should follow that trend. For example, as a matter of public
policy, employers should not have employee handbook provisions and personnel
policies that bind only the employees. To an unwitting employee, such policies
appear to be binding on both parties and effectively lead the employee into a false
sense of security. In reality, the policies are worth little more to the employee than
the paper on which they are written. I I
The majority ofjurisdictions have recognized personnel policies and employee
handbooks as creating an implied contract between employer and employee. 12
These jurisdictions reason that offer, acceptance, and consideration are ascertainable
in these "handbook cases." Although many times employee handbooks contain
unilateral offers to contract, they are offers nonetheless. 13 These jurisdictions inti-
mate that if employers want to avoid changing the employee's durational status,
they have the option of boldly disclaiming that the policies constitute a part of the
employee's employment contract.
Maine has gone to great lengths to prevent handbooks and personnel policies
from changing employees' durational status. In the first place, for example, when
ambiguities that cannot be resolved with reference to extrinsic evidence arise in
contract, they are traditionally resolved against the drafter, 14 which in the employ-
10. Generally speaking, other jurisdictions have sought to limit the doctrine through the
formulation of employee remedies for wrongful discharge and breach of contract. Some of
these remedies sound in contract, others in tort. See generally Joseph C. Marshall 1II, Minimiz-
ing the Risk of Implied-Contract Employment Litigation, PRAc. LAW. Dec. 1987, at, 61, 62-64.
11. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980), the
Michigan Supreme Court provided the following explanation of the idea that employees grow to
depend upon the rules their employers provide:
[W]here an employer chooses to establish [personnel policies or practices] and makes
them known to its employees, the employee relationship is presumably enhanced.
The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal workforce, and the employee
the peace of mind associated with job security and the conviction that he [or she] will
be treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the parties'
minds need not meet on the subject;... [ilt is enough that the employer chooses,
presumably in its own interest, to create an environment in which the employee be-
lieves that, whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are established and
official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and uni-
formly to each employee.
d at 892. See also Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985) ("It
would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce
believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on those
promises.'.
12. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 23, 705 A.2d at 704 n.8
(Lipez, J., dissenting). See also Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. Ray. 1816, 1818-28 (1980)
[hereinafter Note, Protecting At Will Employees] (setting forth a general history of the at-will
doctrine, its original purpose, and recent developments limiting it).
13. No term of art is meant by the term "unilateral offer." As used in this Note, the term
simply means that the offer is made by one party, the employer, and likely affords the employee
no opportunity to bargain for its terms.
14. See, e.g., John Swenson Granite, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 685 A.2d 425, 428 (Me.
1996) (citing T-M Oil Co., Inc. v. Pasquale, 388 A.2d 82, 86 (Me. 1978)); Gendron Realty, Inc.
v. N.J. Gendron Lumber Co., Inc. of Portland, 519 A.2d 723, 725 (Me. 1987) (citing Hills v.
Gardiner Say. Inst., 309 A.2d 877, 881 (Me. 1973); Bourgoin v. Fortier, 310 A.2d 618, 620 (Me.
1973)).
[Vol. 5 1:1
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ment context is generally the employer. This has not been the case, however, in
Maine's employment cases. Instead, employers have more often been favored by
Maine's courts when ambiguities arise. Second, the implied-in-fact contract doc-
trine is a well-established standard of law15 used to recognize the existence of
contracts in which assent has been manifest in some way other than express writ-
ings. But again, this long-standing doctrine is not recognized in Maine's employ-
ment cases. Finally, other jurisdictions have relied upon the theory of promissory
estoppel in cases such as the instant one, reasoning that the employee relied upon
the employer's promise to terminate only after a progressive warning procedure. 16
In Maine, however, it is not even possible to have the handbook recognized as an
offer to contract; hence, there can be no application of the promissory estoppel
doctrine. The three aforementioned concepts are examples of established contract
principles that have not been utilized in Maine's employment cases. This Author
contends that contract principles should be applied with uniformity regardless of
the substance of the dispute and especially in these handbook cases in which the
elements of an implied-in-fact contract are so readily apparent. It is with these
issues of contract law that this Note ultimately concerns itself.
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of Maine case law regarding the
employment-at-will doctrine as well as the Law Court's treatment of employee
handbooks and personnel policies in past decisions. After a brief recitation of the
arguments set forth in Taliento, this Note goes on to consider whether the Taliento
court's application of Maine law addresses the reality of today's employment rela-
tionships and public policy considerations. The Note then explores how another
jurisdiction, Vermont, has dealt with employee handbooks. The Note concludes
that the Taliento court's decision contradicts traditional notions of contract law
and contravenes public policy concerns, and, using Vermont as a benchmark, it
sets forth several suggestions for solutions to that conflict.
1I. BACKGROUND
It has long been settled law in Maine that "a contract of employment for an
indefinite length of time is terminable at the will of either party." 17 This doctrine
was developed at a time when laissez-faire economics predominated thought and
freedom of contract was highly valued. 18 The ability to terminate an employee
15. See supra notes 8-9.
16. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets forth the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
follows: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." REsTAr" ton.,
supra note 9, § 90.
17. Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97, 99 (Me. 1984). See also DeWilde v.
Guy Gannett Publ'g. Co., 797 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Me. 1992); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp.,
590 A.2d 152, 155 (Me. 1991); Merrill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Me. 97, 100, 2A. 847,848
(1886); Blaisdell v. Lewis, 32 Me. 515,516 (1851). See generally supra notes 5,12 (for author-
ity regarding the origins of the at will doctrine) and infra note 18 (same).
18. See Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly "A3-Will" Em-
ployee as Affected by Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33
A.L.R. 4th 123-25 (1984). See also Note, Protecting Employees At Will, supra note 5, at 1933-
35 (giving a general history of the doctrine); Elliott L. Epstein, The Demise of Breach of Em-
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for "good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all" 19 is indeed a powerful remedy for
employers. Notably, however, the United States is virtually the only industrialized
nation to continue to recognize the terminable-at-will doctrine. 20 A recent trend
has led the majority of jurisdictions to recognize that it is possible to contract out
of the at will doctrine. In fact, at least thirty-eight American jurisdictions have
acknowledged that the use of employment handbooks and other personnel policies
that provide progressive discharge procedures create express or implied contrac-
tual restrictions on an employer's discretion to terminate employees.2 1
There was a brief time from the late 1970s to the early 1980s when it seemed
that Maine, too, was moving away from strict adherence to the terminable-at-will
doctrine. In Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hospital,22 a discharged medical
technologist brought suit for breach of an alleged contract of employment. 23 Al-
though Terrio was not hired for a definite term, and in fact had no written employ-
ment contract, the Law Court, taking the totality of circumstances into account,
found in Terrio's favor.24 The Law Court affirmed the trial court's finding in favor
of Terrio, basing its holding on the surrounding circumstances and conduct, in-
cluding oral promises. Even though Terrio was technically an at-will employee,
the court looked beyond technicalities to the intent of the parties and their subjec-
tive understanding of Terrio's employment situation. 25
ployment Contracts and Wrongful Discharge Cases, 8 ME. BJ. 242, 244 (1993) [hereinafter
Epstein, The Demise of Breach of Employment Contracts] ("Based upon an outmoded philoso-
phy, the [employee at will] rule is an extreme example of the doctrines devised by 19th century
apologists to justify and protect the excesses of the Industrial Revolution; it has little place in a
more sophisticated and humane era"); Andre D. Bouffard, Comment, Emerging Protection Against
Retaliatory Discharge: A Public Policy Exception to the EmploymentAt-Will Doctrine in Maine,
38 Ms. L. Rsv. 67, 67-76 (1986) (setting forth a thorough explanation of the time period in
which the employment at-will doctrine became the general rule in this country).
19. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406,413 (5th Cir. 1956).
20. See Jack Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust
Discharge, in INDUsTwAL RELA77o~s RsARTHSc AssOCIATION SERIES, PROCEMINOs oF THE Tun'v-
SEcoND ArumAL MEMNG 155, 157 (Barbara D. Dennis ed., 1980). See also Note, Protecting At
Will Employees, supra note 12, at 1844 (stating that "[t]he United States is the only industrial-
ized country without some form of comprehensive protection against wrongful discharge").
21. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 123, 705 A.2d at 704 n.8
(stating that "[a]s of this writing, 38 jurisdictions have recognized that implied employment
contracts may be found on the basis of language in employee handbooks and in other personnel
policies that restricts an employer's right to discharge an employee to particular reasons ('for
cause') or procedures for termination" and setting forth those jurisdictions).
22. 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977).
23. ld. at 136. Hired in 1955, Terrio experienced no problems on the job until 1973 when a
resident pathologist took charge of the laboratory where Terrio worked. See id. A personality
conflict ensued, culminating with Terrio's termination in February 1975. See id. at 137. Terrio
had been employed by the Millinocket Community Hospital [hereinafter Hospital] for approxi-
mately twenty years at the time of her dismissal. See id.
24. The circumstances that the court considered in coming to its conclusion included oral
promises made by hospital administrators stating that Terrio "was secure in her job for 'the rest
of (her) life,"' personnel policies that dealt specifically with dismissal and grievance proce-
dures, and a company retirement plan. See id. at 137-38. All of these circumstances supported
the court's finding that ajury could have found that there was "evidence of a specific oral prom-
ise of employment for a definite term, that is, until 'normal retirement age."' Id. at 138.
25. See id.
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Seven years later, in Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods2 6 the Law Court
defined its first and only exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine. The court
held that "parties may enter into an employment contract terminable only pursuant
to its express terms-as 'for cause'-by clearly stating their intention to do so,
even though no consideration other than services to be performed or promised is
expected by the employer, or is performed or promised by the employee." 2 7 Al-
though in its holding the court specifically listed "for cause" as an express term, it
appears from the language of the decision to be only an example.28 In other words,
parties to an employment relationship may bargain for specific examples of be-
havior that would constitute terminable conduct, or they can use the broad term
"for cause." The court recognized that "a substantial percentage of the labor force
is protected by collective bargaining agreements or are [sic] employed by federal
or state governments, and can generally be discharged only for 'just cause' 2 9 and
intimated that the same protection from arbitrary and capricious discharge should
apply to those not covered under collective bargaining agreements.3 0 According
to Larrabee, then, a contract for employment may contain whatever terms the par-
ties agree upon.
In 1985, the Law Court followed, and in fact expanded, the Larrabee holding
when it found that an employee handbook became part of an employment contract.
In Wyman v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine,3 1 the court wrote: "We assume with-
out deciding that in the case at bar there was an agreement between the parties for
an employment of indefinite length terminable by the defendant only pursuant to
the terms of the employee handbook."3 2 Despite this reaffirmance and the Law
Court's apparent intention to bring equality and job security to public and private
employees alike, the language of the Larrabee decision has since been eroded and
its holding severely limited.
26. 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984). The plaintiffs in Larrabee expressly or impliedly promised to
work for the defendant at Belfast on a full-time, continuous basis. See id. at 98. In exchange,
the defendant expressly or impliedly promised to pay the plaintiffs a specified wage and to
refrain from discharging them in bad faith or without good cause. See id. The defendant-
employer had promulgated two documents, the "General Policy" and "Work Rules." See id.
Larrabee asserted that such documents served to buttress an implied in fact contract for employ-
ment. The Law Court agreed and set forth the exception to the terminable at will rule noted in
the text. See id. at 99-100.
27. I&
28. The plain language states "parties may enter into an employment contract terminable
only pursuant to its express terms-as 'for cause'-by clearly stating their intention to do so."
Id.
29. 1& at 99.
30. See i
31. 493 A.2d 330 (Me. 1985).
32. Wdliam Wyman was hired as a chef for the Osteopathic Hospital of Maine (OHM) in
1967. See id. at 331. In 1981, Wyman was promoted to head chef, serving in that capacity until
he was terminated in June of 1982. See id. Wyman was discharged for misconduct, specifically,
for engaging in unsanitary workmanship. See id. at 332-33. Although there was no formal
written employment agreement between Wyman and OHM, there was in effect at OHM an "em-
ployee handbook." See id. at 331. This handbook contained the following statement: "This
employee handbook outlines the hospital policies and is considered a portion of the terms and
conditions of employment as well as your benefits." Id.
In 1989, in Libby v. Calais Regional Hospital,33 the Law Court took a notice-
able step back toward the rigid terminable-at-will rule. Elizabeth Libby brought
suit against her former employer, Calais Regional Hospital, for breach of contract
for wrongful discharge.34 When Libby was hired in 1978, she was given an em-
ployee handbook that contained provisions regarding procedures to be followed
when terminating an employee.3 5 The handbook was revised in 1982, and Libby
was given an acknowledgment slip to sign to ensure that she had received and read
the revised handbook.3 6 The acknowledgment slip stated specifically that "this
handbook [does] not constitute a contract of employment." 37 The Libby court
recognized that "[tihe terms of an employment handbook can be used as the means
by which an employment contract may be changed from one terminable-at-will to
one terminable only by its express terms."' 38 Because the handbook was accompa-
nied by an express disclaimer of contract, however, the court found that the hand-
book did not alter Libby's employment status; that is, Libby remained an employee-
at-will.39
The court did not stop there. It went on to interpret Larrabee as requiring that
any intention to impose restrictions upon the employer's right to discharge an em-
ployee must be clearly stated. The court implied that "clearly" meant that such
restriction should be "in writing."40 Justice Homby, joined by Justice Roberts in
the Libby dissent, asserted that the majority misconstrued Larrabee and unneces-
sarily elevated the term "clearly." 4 1 The dissent argued that there were issues in
Libby for a jury to hear and resolve. Nevertheless, Libby remains the standard
according to which Maine courts determine the effects of employee handbooks
and personnel policies on altering the terms of an at-will employment arrange-
ment.42
33. 554 A.2d 1181 (Me. 1989). For an excellent analysis of the Libby decision, see Russell
Goldsmith, Note, Libby v. Calais Regional Hospital: Contracting Out of Maine's Employment-
at-will Doctrine, 42 ME. L. REv. 553 (1990).
34. See Libby v. Calais Reg'l Hosp., 554 A.2d at 1182.
35. See id. at 1182-83.
36. See id. at 1182.
37. Seeki
38. id. at 1183.
39. See id
40. See Libby v. Calais Reg'l Hosp., 554 A.2d at 1183.
41. See id. at 1184 (Hornby, J., dissenting).
42. Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152 (Me. 1991), reaffirmed the Libby holding.
In Bard, a former employee of Bath Iron Works Corporation (BIW) brought a suit, alleging
discharge in violation of the Whistleblower's Protection Act, breach of employment contract,
wrongful discharge, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See id. at
153. The trial court granted BIW's motion for summary judgment on all but the Whistleblower's
Protection Act which, at the close of the evidence, was denied as well. See id. Bard appealed,
alleging that his employer was retaliating against him for informing Navy inspectors of what he
viewed as less than satisfactory workmanship. See id. at 154. Bard alleged that, though he was
hired for an indefinite duration, BIW provided him with a pamphlet entitled "Rules and Regula-
tions" that served to create an implied contract between he and his employer. The pamphlet
stated that he could be terminated only for violating one of the rules or regulations contained
therein. See id. at 155. The court stated that there is only one exception to the employee at-will
doctrine and set it forth as follows:
The one exception is that parties to an employment contract of indefinite duration
"may enter into an employment contract terminable only pursuant to its express terms-
as 'for cause'-by clearly stating their intention to do so." Such a contract must ex-
pressly restrict the employer's common law right to discharge the employee at will
and clearly limit the employer to the enumerated method or methods of terminating
the employment. "Written or oral language merely implying that discharge is for
cause only is not sufficient to bind an employer."
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In 1993, however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreted Maine
law to support the notion that a handbook does not have to explicitly state the
phrase "for cause" to transform an employment relationship from terminable-at-
will to discharge for cause only. In Cummings v. South Portland Housing Author-
ity,4 3 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that an employee hand-
book could become incorporated into an employment contract and alter the right
of the employer to terminate the employee at will even if the handbook did not say
that the termination had to be "for cause."44 This First Circuit determination ef-
fectively interjected the notion of implied contract into Maine employment law at
a time when no such notion was recognized.
II1. THE SUBJECT CASE:
TAUENTO V. PORTLAND WEST NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING COUNCIL
A. The Majority Opinion
Neil Taliento worked as a youth counselor and educator for sixteen years,
most recently for Portland West.45 Taliento was hired in January of 1990, and
terminated on November 21, 1995. 46 During his time at Portland West, Taliento
directed two programs for troubled youths: the Community Employment Project
(CEP) and YouthBuild Portland (YouthBuild).4 7 Just one month prior to his termi-
nation, Taliento received a positive performance evaluation from Portland West's
Executive Director, Peter O'Donnell. Taliento received high marks in all areas of
his performance and was given a five-percent raise, the highest raise afforded by
the organization.4 8
Portland West had a personnel policy that was distributed to its employees.
One provision of the policy provided a method of termination for Portland West
employees. It appeared to be the general understanding among Portland West
administrators and staff that the procedure set forth in the personnel policy was to
be followed whenever an employee was terminated. 4 9 Portland West terminated
Taliento, however, without the benefit of the personnel policy procedure.50 He
appealed to the Board of Directors, but the Board denied his request for reinstate-
Id. at 155 (quoting Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 99-100 (Me. 1984)
(emphasis added)). The court found no evidence of any intention (let alone the requisite clear
statement of intention) that BIV would discharge its employees only for cause. Bard urged the
court to overrule or limit Libby. The court responded, "Even if we were inclined to overrule or
limit Libby, we would decline to do so on this record." Id.
43. 985 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1993).
44. See id. at 3.
45. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council.
1997 ME 194,705 A.2d 696 (No. CUM-96-812).
46. See id. at 2, 5.
47. Both programs were designed to assist troubled youths in developing valuable work and life
skills. See i& at 2.
48. See id. at 5.
49. The evidence showed that Taliento, O'Donnell, and at least two other board members
thought that the policy was mandatory. See supra note 6.
50. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council.
1997 ME 194,705 A.2d 696 (No. CUM-96-812).
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ment.5 1 Subsequently, Mr. Taliento brought suit against his former employer for
breach of his employment contract. Taliento's complaint alleged four counts of
breach of contract: "failure to satisfy the Personnel Policies termination require-
ments," "failure to adhere to established appeals practices," "failure to honor the
promise of continued employment allegedly made by O'Donnell," and "failure to
honor an implied two-year employment contract allegedly created by the HUD
grant."' 52 The trial court granted Portland West's motion for summary judgment
on all counts, and Taliento appealed. 53
Although the majority recognized that a termination procedure existed and
that such procedure had been promoted and followed by the parties to this action
in the past, the court looked to its decision in Libby and stated that "the personnel
policy merely provides a procedure to be followed, a method of discharging an
employee. It does not 'clearly limit [Portland West] to that method of terminating
[Taliento's] employment and does not expressly restrict [Portland West's] right to
discharge an employee.' ' 54 The court emphasized that any deviation from the
employee-at-will doctrine must be "clearly stated," and that the personnel policy
in question did not meet that requirement. 55
The court also noted that Taliento was not discharged by O'Donnell but by the
Personnel Committee.56 The restriction in Paragraph 11 of the personnel policies,
the court pointed out, "is on the authority of the Executive Director and the Pro-
gram Director and does not affect the authority of the Personnel Committee, nor
that of the Board of Directors." 57 Additionally, the court noted that Taliento had
the benefit of an appeal within Portland West and maintained that "[tihe failure of
that appeal is insufficient reason to [sic] for us to discard or ignore the law that is
clear and well-settled."'58 The other counts of Taliento's complaint were given
cursory attention by the court and found equally unpersuasive.5 9
51. See idi at 6.
52. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 1997 ME 194,16,705 A.2d
at 698-99.
53. See id. 6, 705 A.2d at 699.
54. Id. 1 11, 705 A.2d at 699 (alterations in original).
55. See i (emphasis in original).
56. See id 112, 705 A.2d at 699.
57. Id.
58. Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 1997 ME 194, 1 12, 705 A.2d at
699.
59. Specifically, the court stated:
Taliento's other contentions do not merit extensive consideration. There is nothing in
the record to support a contract claim that Taliento was entitled to an appeal process
in which the President of the Board could vote only to break a tie, and therefore no
dispute of material fact exists on that point. Given O'Donnell's lack of authority to
unilaterally hire Portland West employees as well as the indefinite nature of his prom-
ise, the oral promises he made to Taliento did not create an enforceable contract for a
definite term of employment as a matter of law. There is no evidence that either
Portland West or HUD intended to confer an enforceable benefit upon Taliento pursu-
ant to the HUD grant awarded to fund YouthBuild; he was therefore at most an inci-
dental beneficiary of the grant.
Id. 13,705 A.2d at 700.
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B. The Dissent
Justice Lipez, joined by Justices Roberts and Dana in dissent, expressed his
opinion that "the court's decision perpetuates the misapplication of special rules of
contract law to claims that an employment contract of indefinite duration precludes
at will termination."6 0 Justice Lipez wrote that Taliento's case was an opportunity
to "revisit[ ] our precedents in this area, reconsidering the extent to which an em-
ployment handbook or personnel policy that purports to govern termination may
constitute a binding contract, and clarifying the principles of contract law to be
applied in these employment cases."'6 1
The dissent began with a description of the historical use of implied-in-fact
contracts and noted that whether a contract is express or implied makes no differ-
ence to the contract's binding power.62 The distinction, the dissent wrote, "lies
merely in the mode of manifesting assent."63 The dissent went on to mention that
ambiguities in contract law are generally construed against the drafter, but in Libby
this was not the case, nor was it the case in Taliento.64 The dissent made clear that
the majority's deviation from traditional contract principles was unfounded. 65
Justice Lipez emphasized that the court has historically failed to justify its
reasons for departing from ordinary contract principles in its consideration of em-
ployment contracts of indefinite duration.66 The dissent could see no reason to
continue this divergence, especially since it "runs counter to the trend in the major-
ity ofjurisdictions." 67 Justice Lipez stated that "[w]hether a contract may be im-
plied from an employee handbook or other documents, oral promises, the conduct
of the parties, and other circumstances is a question of fact for a jury to decide."6 8
The dissent cited several Maine cases to support this proposition.69
The dissent recognized the significance of Larrabee's "establishment of an
exception to the employment-at-will rule."7 0 It noted that it was the first time the
Law Court "recognized that a provision for job security in a contract of indefinite
duration could be binding without additional, independent consideration other than
the services to be performed by the employee." 7 1 Additionally, the dissent as-
serted that the Larrabee holding did not stand for the proposition that the sole
60. Id. 14,705 A.2d at 700 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 15, 705 A.2d at 700 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
63. id.
64. See supra note 14 for authority to support the proposition that ambiguities are generally
construed against the drafter.
65. See Taliento v. Portland NV. Neighborhood Planning Council, 23, 705 A.2d at 704-05
(Lipez, J., dissenting).
66. See id. 23, 705 A.2d at 704 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
67. See id. 23, 705 A.2d at 704-05 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
68. Id. 23, 705 A.2d at 705 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
69. See id. (citing Lawson v. McLeod, 123 A.2d 199,200 (1956); Clvin v. Barrett, 151 Me.
344,350, 118 A.2d 775,779 (Me. 1955); Bryant v. Fogg, 125 Me. 420, 134 A. 510 (152 Me. 67,
69, 1926); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 891-92 (Mich.
1980); Taylor v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466,469-71 (VL 1993)).




exception to the employment-at-will rule is when a contract has an explicit "for
cause" provision. 72
To counter the majority's argument that it was the Board and not O'Donnell
who terminated Taliento, the dissent noted that the termination was actually begun
by O'Donnell.7 3 Furthermore, Justice Lipez noted that "the record includes ample
evidence that paragraph 11 was generally understood to be the mandatory method
of termination." 74 Also, assuming that the policies were contractually binding, the
record raises an issue of material fact concerning whether O'Donnell complied
with the paragraph 11 procedures when he terminated Taliento.7 5 The dissent
concludes, generally speaking, by asserting that there was a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether Portland West's Personnel Policies and the surrounding cir-
cumstances created an employment contract terminable pursuant to its express
terms.7 6 Therefore, the dissenters would vacate the summary judgment as to count
I and remand that breach of contract claim for trial. 77
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Taliento Case
Portland West's Personnel Policy required that a supervisor document any
performance problems, inform the employee of the problem, and give the em-
ployee "a stated period to correct the situation.' 78 Although Portland West's poli-
cies "contain no promises of continued employment or employment for a specific
term,"7 9 the fact that paragraph 11 sets forth a three-step termination procedure for
the Executive Director or Program Director to follow, is evidence that Portland
West intended that its employees be discharged only when there existed an
irresolvable problem. How much clearer could Portland West have been in ex-
pressing that it would discharge its employees only for reasonable cause? More-
over, unlike the facts of Libby, Portland West's Personnel Policy provided a single
method of discharge for the organization's employees. Paragraph 11 of the Port-
land West policy contained more than a mere implication that discharge was to be
for cause only, it provided a specific procedure meant to restrict Portland West's
ability to terminate its employees.
72. Justice Lipez observed that "[olur opinion [in Larrabee] alludes to 'for cause' only as an
example of an express term pursuant to which such a contract could be terminable .... We thereby
indicated that the relevant contractual term could consist of procedural protections... rather than
an enumeration of substantive standards or even the recitation of the magic words 'for cause."'
Id. at 117, 705 A.2d at 701-02 (Lipez, J., dissenting). This idea is in agreement with the First
Circuit's interpretation of Maine law in Cummings. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text.
73. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 124,705 A.2d at 705 (Lipez,
J., dissenting).
74. Id., 1 25, 705 A.2d at 705 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
75. See id. 26, 705 A.2d at 706 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
76. See id. 1 25-26, 705 A.2d at 706 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
77. See id. 27, 705 A.2d at 706 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
78. Id. 3, 705 A.2d at 698.
79. Id.
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O'Donnell informed Taliento in June of 1995 that Taliento had to follow the
paragraph 11 procedures to terminate a YouthBuild staff member.80 Taliento un-
derstood that, as a program director, he was required to follow the procedure set
out in the personnel policy. When Taliento was terminated, however, he did not
receive the benefit of the paragraph 11 procedure. Instead, he was discharged with
no notice. He was told to "clean out his desk and leave immediately." 81 It contra-
dicts common notions of equity and public policy for an employer to impose upon
its employees a code of conduct, but not itself be bound by the same code.82 Such
inconsistency only supports the theory that the employee-at-will doctrine is one-
sided, favoring employers.
Furthermore, Portland West's conduct was not indicative of an employer that
viewed its employees as strictly at-will. Taliento received a positive performance
evaluation from O'Donnell just one month prior to his termination. 83 According
to O'Donnell's own account of these matters, he told Taliento that "as long as I'm
around, I would like you also working here." 84 This promise, coupled with the
personnel policy termination procedure would likely lead an ordinary person to
believe that Portland West intended that Neil Taliento should be given cause for
his termination.
Surely, the employee-at-will doctrine was not meant to frustrate contracting
parties' intentions. Thus, in a case such as Taliento, where there is evidence that
the parties to the suit have knowledge of conditions sufficient to create an implied-
in-fact contract for employment; that is, offer, acceptance and consideration, it
should be the jury who decides what the parties understood and intended. Further-
more, if employment contracts are limited only to express, written language, as
the Taliento majority found, what then is left for the jury to decide?
A contractual provision is defined as ambiguous if a reasonable person is ca-
pable of interpreting it in more than one way.85 Ambiguities in contracts are gen-
erally resolved against the drafter,86 which in this case was Portland West. At the
very least, a fact finder should have weighed the evidence regarding the interpreta-
tion of Portland West's Personnel Policy as it related to altering Taliento's employ-
ment status.
In Terrio, the Law Court recognized the implied-in-fact model of contract
formation. 87 In Larrabee, the court recognized an exception to the at-will rule.88
80. See id. 25, 705 A.2d at 705-06 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
81. lML 5, 705 A.2d at 698.
82. See cases cited supra note I1 for authority supporting this proposition.
83. See Taliento v. Portland XV. Neighborhood Planning Council. 15, 705 A.2d at 698.
84. I.
85. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 52 (6th ed. 1990). See also Portland Valve. Inc. v. Rockwood
Sys., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983) (explaining a contract is ambiguous if reasonably suscep-
tible of different interpretations).
86. See supra note 14 citing sources to support this proposition.
87. See Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977). See also supra
notes 8-9, for discussion of implied in fact contract theory in general.
88. See Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d at 99-100.
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As set forth in Larrabee, however, the rule seemed irreconcilable with an implied-
in-fact model of contract formation because it seemed to require a clearly expressed
limitation. Libby eliminated any doubt as to the nature of the contracts to which
the Larrabee exception would apply by indicating that exceptions to the employ-
ment-at-will rule would be limited to express contracts. 89 Specifically, the court
in Libby recognized that "[t]he terms of an employment handbook can be used as
the means by which an employment contract may be changed from one termi-
nable-at-will to one terminable only by its express terms."9 0 The court sharpened
its point by impliedly limiting the defined exception to highly specific written
contracts.9 1
The Taliento majority asserted that the Libby decision settled the employee
handbook issue by making it "clear that language in an employee handbook...
providing a method of discharge and implying that discharge of an employee will
be only for cause, is insufficient to restrict the employer's common law right to
terminate the employment. ' 9 2 It is this Author's contention that the Libby holding
should be limited; the Law Court went too far when it narrowed the at-will excep-
tion to express, written contracts. Implied-in-fact contracts have long been a rec-
ognized part of our jurisprudence 93 and should continue to be recognized uni-
formly, under all circumstances. An implied contract is simply a contract, com-
posed of the traditional elements of offer, acceptance, and consideration, to which
assent may be manifest by conduct rather than words. 94
Even in the event that it is determined that implied-in-fact principles should
not apply to employment contract situations, Libby is distinguishable from the
case at hand. In the first place, the Libby handbook was accompanied by an ex-
press disclaimer of contract. Because no such disclaimer existed in Portland West's
policy, Portland West should be bound by the terms that they drafted. Further-
more, in Libby, the "employee handbook did not clearly limit the employer to one
method of termination."'95 In contrast, "Portland West's Policy clearly stated that
Mr. O'Donnell could recommend Mr. Taliento's termination only after complying
with the Policy, and Mr. O'Donnell himself has admitted that the Policy was bind-
ing."'96 It is apparent that there was a jury question on whether any portion of the
personnel policy had become part of the employment contract. As Justice Homby
wrote in his Libby dissent, "I see no reason to insist upon the precise language
,employees will not be terminated except for cause' as a precondition to letting a
jury find a meeting of the minds on the subject.... Ordinary contract law prin-
89. See Libby v. Calais Reg'l Hosp., 554 A.2d at 1183.
90. ld
91. This Author does not suggest that oral contracts cannot also be express contracts, only
that the Libby decision appears to favor written contracts.
92. Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 1 10, 705 A.2d at 699 (citations
omitted).
93. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) ("[T]he law of contracts in most, if
not all, jurisdictions long has employed a process by which agreements, though not formalized
in writing, may be 'implied."').
94. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNmAcrs § 4 cmt. a (1981).
95. 94 Id.
96. Reply Brief of Appellant at 4, Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council,
1997 ME 194,705 A.2d 696 (No. CUM-96-812).
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ciples should permit a factfinder simply to determine what it is that the parties
agreed upon."'97
The majority implied a desire to adhere to precedent. 98 There does not appear
to be any modem justification, however, for adhering so strictly to the rigid and
often arbitrary and capricious employee-at-will doctrine. The court created the
exception, and it is within the court's role to interpret and modify the rule as the
need arises. This Author agrees with Justice Lipez when he stated in dissent:
We have not articulated in Larrabee, Libby or Bard a sufficient reason for our
departure from ordinary contract principles in our consideration of employment
contracts of indefinite duration, and the court does not do so in this case. Our
departure runs counter to the trend in the majority of jurisdictions. We should
end this divergence and apply the law of contracts implied in fact to employment
contracts of indefinite duration.... Whether a contract be implied from an em-
ployee handbook or other documents, oral promises, the conduct of the parties,
and other circumstances is a question of fact for a jury to decide.99
To the present, the Law Court has chosen not to follow this reasoning. Perhaps in
the future, through the vigorous argument of Maine's bar, the court will be per-
suaded otherwise.
B. Vemont Law: A Benclunark?1 00
If Maine should, at some future date, choose to limit the at-will doctrine, it
would do well to utilize one or more of Vermont's rationalizations.1 0 1 Vermont
has taken a progressive view of these "handbook cases." Vermont recognizes three
methods of limiting the at-will doctrine. Those methods are: (1) the public policy
exception, (2) the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and (3) express or implied con-
tract theory. Each of these methods will be examined in turn.
The first method of limiting the at-will doctrine is the public policy exception.
The plaintiffs in Payne v. Rozendaal,1 0 2 a wrongful discharge action, complained
that they were discharged from their employment solely on the basis of their age.10 3
No state law was in existence when the action was commenced that would have
restricted the defendant's right to discharge the plaintiffs on the basis of age. Their
complaint, therefore, was dismissed in the Superior Court. The Vermont Supreme
97. Libby v. Calais Reg'l Hosp., 554 A.2d at 1184 (Homby, J., dissenting).
98. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council. 1 9.10, 11, 705 A.2d at
699.
99. See id. 23, 705 A.2d at 704-05.
100. For a similar comparison of Maine law and Vermont law. see Jeffrey A. Thaler, The
Common Law of Employment Law in Maine: It's Broke and Needs Fixing, 10 M. BJ. 316
(1995). It is interesting to note that New Hampshire law and Massachusetts law are very similar
to Maine.
101. It is important to recognize that Vermont views the at-will doctrine as a means of con-
tract construction, whereas Maine appears to view the doctrine as substantive law. In other
words, the at-will doctrine in Vermont is a rebuttable presumption whereas in Maine, it seems to
be a substantive limitation. This is an important distinction and may be why the Law Court has
resisted change in this area. See Sherman v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 500 A.2d 230.232 (VL 1985).
At the same time, it is possible to make changes in the substantive law. Commentators have
suggested other reasons to explain the Law Court's resistance to change in this area. See, e.g.,
Epstein, The Demise of Breach of Employment Contracts, supra note 18, at 244.
102. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986).
103. See id. at 586-87.
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Court, however, found that dismissal based solely on age "contravene[d] a clear
and compelling public policy." 104 The court stated: "We do not find the absence
of a statutory directive concerning age discrimination to be dispositive of whether
a public policy against such practices existed at the time of the discharges." 105
Many states limit the at-will doctrine on the basis of strong public policy con-
siderations. Courts vary the criteria for defining such public policy reasons.106
Maine has not ruled out the possibility of recognizing the public policy excep-
tion. 107 The exception is, however, generally speaking, for major contraventions
of public policy, such as discrimination, retaliatory discharge, or an employer's
asking employees to perjure themselves. 10 8
It is this Author's contention that any opportunity for an employer to termi-
nate an employee without good reason contravenes general notions of public policy.
For purposes of this discussion, the definition of the term "public policy" is of
utmost importance. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated the definition of public
policy succinctly:
Sometimes ... public policy is declared by Constitution; sometimes by stat-
ute; sometimes by judicial decision. More often, however, it abides only in the
customs and conventions of the people-in their clear consciousness and convic-
tion of what is naturally and inherently just and right between man and man. It
regards the primary principles of equity and justice and is sometimes expressed
under the title of social and industrial justice, as it is conceived by our body politic.
When a course of conduct is cruel or shocking to the average man's conception of
justice, such course of conduct must be held to be obviously contrary to public
policy, though such policy has never been so written in the bond, whether it be
Constitution, statute, or decree of court. 109
There is a good argument that discharging an employee for bad reason or no rea-
son at all is shocking to the average man's conception of justice. Everyone has an
interest in job security. This is one reason, among many, that the at-will doctrine
has been so often criticized, and it is one reason why the doctrine should now be
limited.
The second method used in Vermont to limit the at will doctrine is promissory
estoppel. In Foote v. Simmonds Precision Product Co., Inc.,110 the plaintiff, a
104. Id. at 588.
105. Id.
106. See iad; Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merchandising Corp., 551 F. Supp. 544, 547-
48 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1033-34 (Ariz.
1985); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (III. Dec. 1981); Mar-
tin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. App. 1979); Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 436
A.2d 1140, 1144 (N.H. 1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis.
1983). Notably, the public policy exception applies not only "for refusing to do that which the
law forbids (e.g., committing perjury)," but also "for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving
on a jury)." See Smith-Pfeffer v. Fernald State Sch., 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (Mass. 1989). See
also GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 164-65 (Mass. 1995); Upton v. JWP
Businessland, 682 N.E.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Mass. 1997).
107. See Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 100 (Me. 1984).
108. See supra note 93 (citing cases from several jurisdictions that recognize a variety of
public policy reasons for limiting the at will doctrine).
109. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d at 588 (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505 (Ohio 1916)).
110. 613 A.2d 1277 (Vt. 1992).
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computer operator, was discharged, allegedly for falsifying his time card. 11 The
plaintiff maintained, however, "that his discharge was the result of his efforts to
exercise the grievance procedure published in the [defendant's] employee hand-
book." 112 The plaintiff had an excellent work history prior to his use of the griev-
ance procedure. The facts showed that the plaintiff was concerned about the hiring
of a supervisor who was perceived by employees as unqualified.11 3 He wished to
complain to management about this new supervisor. Concerned about his own job
security, the plaintiff approached an employee relations manager who directed his
attention to the grievance procedure set forth in the employee handbook. 114 After
pursuing the procedure and after experiencing escalating grief from his superiors,
the plaintiff was terminated. Ajury found for the plaintiff, relying on the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. 115
The handbook in Foote specifically stated that "[i]f you follow these steps,
you cannot be criticized or penalized in any way," and the personnel manager in
fact testified that the company intended that employees rely on the statement. 116
The elements of promissory estoppel, set out in the Restatement of Contracts and
followed by the Foote court, are as follows: "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promissee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 117
It is this Author's contention that any procedure set out in an employee hand-
book should be considered to represent the intent of the employer with regard to its
interaction and relationship with its employees. In other words, if an employer sets
forth a procedure in an employee handbook, it is a fair assumption that the
employer's employees will rely on the idea that the procedure will be utilized
fairly and at the appropriate time. In Taliento, for instance, it seems reasonable
that Mr. Taliento would rely on the idea that, in the unfortunate event that his
continued employment was called into question, the termination procedure in the
personnel policy would be activated and fairly pursued, especially considering
that he was directed by his superiors to use the procedure when discharging em-
ployees beneath him. Again, if an employer does not intend for the policies set
forth in an employee handbook to bind the employee and employer alike, they
should incorporate a statement disclaiming as much.
Finally, Vermont has recognized that "personnel manual provisions inconsis-
tent with an at-will relationship may be used as evidence that the contract of em-
ployment requires good cause for termination despite the fact that the manual was
not part of the initial employment agreement."1 18 In other words, language found
in an employee handbook can, through the application of standard contract prin-
ciples, alter the durational status of an at-will employee. This idea originated in




115. 114 See id
116. Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prod. Co., Inc., 613 A.2d 1277, 1278 (VL 1992).
117. See id. at 1281 (quoting REmSTA'ENTm (SEcoND) oF CoRAcTs § 90(1) (1981)).
118. Taylor v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466,471 (Vt. 1993).
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1985 when Vermont's Supreme Court decided that an employee and employer could
bargain for, and agree to be bound by, termination provisions set forth in a person-
nel manual. 119
A year later, in Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,120 the Vermont Supreme Court
found that an employee manual, handed out at employee orientation, became part
of the employment contract and that the termination provision specifically altered
the at-will status of Ethan Allen's employees. 121 It appears that the holding was
reached, in part, due to the fact that just having a termination procedure is at odds
with the notion of at-will status. 122 If an employee is truly at-will, his employer
has the right to terminate him without notice, for any reason. There would be no
procedure. The Benoir court used implied contract theory to reach its conclu-
sion. 123
Overall, Vermont law is a useful benchmark for those jurisdictions, such as
Maine, that have not yet limited the at-will doctrine. The Taliento majority exam-
ined Mr. Taliento's claims in a compartmentalized manner; that is, they did not
consider all of his circumstances together, but rather in individual segments. Maine
should adopt a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to evaluating these situa-
tions. 124 Such an approach would be fair and equitable, and would pave a wider
avenue by which the Law Court may see its way to change the at-will doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the trend toward limiting the employee-at-will doctrine, Taliento
presented a logical opportunity to reassess Maine's current outlook on the subject.
Employers would still have safeguards. Employers could still draft at-will provi-
sions into their applications, for instance, or include a disclaimer of contract in
their handbooks; 12 5 but if an employer is going to hold an employee handbook or
a personnel policy out to its employees for guidance, it too should be bound by the
letter of those documents.
Karen J. Kimball
119. See Sherman v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 500 A.2d at 232-33 (finding that a bilateral agree-
ment was formed to make the manual terms part of a specific employee's employment contract.
Sherman left for another day the issue of "whether the employee manual itself created enforce-
able contract rights generally").
120. 514 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1986).
121. Id. at 718.
122. See id.
123. See id. See also Farnum v. Brattleboro Retreat, Inc., 671 A.2d 1249 (Vt. 1995) (holding
that despite disclaimers contained in employee handbooks, a jury could have reasonably con-
cluded that the handbooks created an implied contract precluding discharge without cause);
Taylor v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466 (Vt. 1993) (holding that manual provisions commit-
ting the employer to a progressive discipline system were sufficient for a jury to find that the
employment contract restricted the defendant to terminating the plaintiff only for cause).
124. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (setting forth an example of
a totality-of-the-circumstances-test cited in Vermont cases). Although Vermont has not for-
mally adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances-test, it has quoted, with approval, jurisdictions
that have adopted such an approach. See, e.g., Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 514 A.2d 716, 718
(Vt. 1986).
125. See Linda S. Johnson, The Employee Handbook: Careful Drafting Makes the Difference
Between Having a Sword or a Shield, 3 EbrLoYvm'r L. BAsics 170 (1997) (explaining various
safeguards employers may take when drafting employee handbooks to ensure that their employ-
ees remain at-will).
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